The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2008

Current Ranking	1st		Fish Price	1.00	US$
Annual Profit	120	€	Price per ton	60.00	US$
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Fish Caught	4,000	
Ships Owned/Sent out	10/10		Total Ships Fishing	230	
Current Cash on Hand	6,895	€	1.00 € =	1.4503	US$
Current Net Worth	10,343	€	Change	N/A	

Current Strategy	Since this is the first night of the simulation, I have opted not to create a strategy until I get a better feel and understanding for the game. In a couple of days, after I have caught some fish and understand the results of having ships, I will be better able to make more strategic decisions.
How it is working	As of now, I have no idea how this is working. Hopefully I will have a better idea next year.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2009

Current Ranking	4th		Fish Price	0.60	US$
Annual Profit	151	€	Price per ton	70.00	US$
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Fish Caught	6,779	
Ships Owned/Sent out	10/10		Total Ships Fishing	187	
Current Cash on Hand	7,046	€	1.00 € =	1.4510	US$
Current Net Worth	10,943	€	Change	+0.0007	US$

Current Strategy	I will continue to send out all of my ships until I make a substantial amount of profit so I can buy more boats.
How it is working	By sending out all ten of my boats, I lost no money and made a profit from the fish I caught.
Class Application	There was a group of individuals who wanted to form some type of treaty that would require every country to dock at least one of their ships. The price of tuna went down, indicating that we caught many fish. This is why the members of the team wanted to form a treaty, so that the class does not deplete the supply as quickly as we are currently doing. The entire class did not oblige.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2010

Current Ranking	3rd		Fish Price	0.57	US$
Annual Profit	73	€	Price per ton	70.00	US$
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Fish Caught	4,273	
Ships Owned/Sent out	10/10		Total Ships Fishing	231	
Current Cash on Hand	7,119	€	1.00 € =	1.4561	US$
Current Net Worth	10,565	€	Change	+0.0057	US$

Current Strategy	For the second year in a row, I sent out all of my ships and did well. I plan to continue this strategy until it fails or until I need to find a new one.
How it is working	By sending out all ten of my boats, I lost no money and made a profit from the fish I caught. I know that I will eventually need to reevaluate my strategy, as it might fail and money may be lost, especially with other countries building larger fleets, thus gaining more money and edging me out of the competition. Additionally, the tuna population will continue to decrease, and changes may need to be made in order to insure the simulation does not end prematurely. Until then, I will continue my strategy of sending out my entire fleet.
New Strategy	A treaty was proposed recently, and I am considering joining it, although my current strategy is working.
Class Application	Globalization, Treaties

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2011

Current Ranking	14th		Fish Price	0.79	US$
Annual Profit	-2060	€	Price per ton	60.00	US$
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Fish Caught	4,423	
Ships Owned/Sent out	10/0		Total Ships Fishing	186	
Current Cash on Hand	5,059	€	1.00 € =	1.4567	US$
Current Net Worth	8,492	€	Change	+0.0117	US$

Current Strategy	I did not submit an annual report for this year.
New Strategy	A new treaty was proposed in class. The main idea behind the treaty is to try to get the entire class to agree to dry dock all of their ships but one. By only sending out one ship, it would increase the demand for fish, as a very small number would be caught. Thus, the price of fish would increase, and the cost of dry docking our ships would be minimal.
Class Application	Anarchy: Nothing is above the state; Nothing can force the state to do anything. Self-Help: Since there is nobody to depend upon, except ourselves, we must look out for the interests of strictly our state. This causes isolation distrust, power politics, and conflict. If I cannot trust other states, I can only rely on myself and on my resources to make money and be successful. When the treaty was proposed, it brought up an interesting discussion about these issues. All of the states in this simulation are sovereign, or the power to rule itself without someone outside telling them what to do. When the treaty was proposed, it was like someone else trying to tell us

what to do.

Right now, the Tunawars simulates the basic principles of international relations.

Dominance: If all of the countries were to agree to a one-boat-only treaty, it would give way for a free rider to emerge and enjoy the success of open seas. There is no real way of punishing these free riders, especially since the treaty would be voluntary and have no penalties or consequences for violating the terms. So, if a free rider were to emerge, that state would have dominance over all other states. States that do not follow the treaty would be able to manipulate the simulation to their advantage. Not only would that state have more money, they would also have the power to threaten the rest with promises of continuing to send out many ships.

Reciprocity: The whole idea behind this new treaty is that is everybody cooperates, and everybody receives a reward. If we all contribute to each other's success, we will all be successful ourselves.

Identity: If the treaty were signed by all states, it would create a sense of identity, or community, amongst the states. We would all identify with wanting to be successful and that nobody, including ourselves, fail the simulation.

Realism: Realistically, it will prove difficult to get the entire class to sign a treaty that requires only one ship to be sent out. In addition, it is very possible that a free rider will emerge if the treaty were to be signed. We make power decisions to maximize our own power gains.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2012

Current Ranking	13th		Fish Price	0.47	US$
Annual Profit	-267	€	Price per ton	70.00	US$
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Fish Caught	7,736	
Ships Owned/Sent out	10/10		Total Ships Fishing	224	
Current Cash on Hand	4,793	€	1.00 € =	1.4658	US$
Current Net Worth	8,198	€	Change	+0.0148	US$

Current Strategy	I feel like the only thing I can do is to send out my entire fleet. Because I lost so much money the day I forgot to submit an annual report, I cannot afford to dry dock any of my ships again.
How it is working	Most people in class are sending out all of their fleets. This is not working very well, and the price of fish is steadily declining as the years pass.
New Strategy	A treaty was recently proposed in class. The class is looking at cooperating by sending only one ship out each year so that the price of fish increases drastically. The fewer ships we send out, the fewer fish are caught, thus the price will increase. I plan to join this agreement when it is finalized. Until then, I have to continue to send my entire fleet out to sea.
Class Application	I plan to join the treaty for multiple reasons. The first, and most obvious, is because I am concerned about the tuna population dropping below 500, thus ending the simulation for everybody. Also, I did not look very closely at this simulation, and it appears that those states who are taking the lead and pro-

posing these changes have invested much of their time to try and figure out a way for everybody to succeed. I am a little lost when it comes to figuring out all of the tricks and plans to be successful.

I am just looking to finish the simulation, and the way to ensure this is to keep the tuna population up. So not only is it a matter of simply following their directions, but I feel like I have an outlet, or foundation, if I ever need help.

Additionally, I believe that if we all cooperate, we can all be successful. I am not too concerned about extra credit, and would not care where it ends up, as long as nobody fails.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2013

Current Ranking	11th		Fish Price	0.53	US$
Annual Profit	63	€	Price per ton	65.00	US$
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Fish Caught	3,306	
Ships Owned/Sent out	10/10		Total Ships Fishing	193	
Current Cash on Hand	4,855	€	1.00 € =	1.4723	US$
Current Net Worth	8,266	€	Change	+0.0068	US$

Current Strategy	I sent all of my fleets out again to try and get out of a negative value.
How it is working	I got myself out of bankruptcy.
New Strategy	Those who can afford to do so are going to start sending only 20% of their fleets out. The fish population is low, so we need to let the population replenish. I plan to send out only two of my ships.
Class Application	Dominance: Those who follow the treaty and class proposal will form a type of alliance against the countries that do not. We will not trade or make agreements with those individuals in the class, and will not include them in any "sharing" or cooperation. On the other hand, states that plan on free riding also have an advantage. Their dominance comes from the threat of not cooperating. They can hold the "I'll keep sending my entire fleet out" threat over other states' heads. Reciprocity: A new proposal was briefly introduced that indicated a "rotating" system where certain people are allowed to send out more than just 1 or 2 ships so that they get huge profits. By rotating this through the class, it would enable everybody to make a large profit at least once.

Identity: The fish population is startlingly low, and for all of us to succeed and prevent the simulation from ending, we need to start looking out for one another, not just ourselves.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2014

Current Ranking	12th		Fish Price	3.54	US$
Annual Profit	-1568	€	Price per ton	75.00	US$
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Fish Caught	1,297	
Ships Owned/Sent out	10/2		Total Ships Fishing	100	
Current Cash on Hand	3,287	€	1.00 € =	1.4721	US$
Current Net Worth	6,683	€	Change	+0.0002	US$

Current Strategy	After learning that the fish population is dropping very quickly, threatening to end the simulation for all, the class decided to try to reduce the number of total ships in the sea, creating a rise in fish prices that will not only encourage a slower depletion but ultimately more profits as well.
How it is working	Although I lost money, the price of tuna did increase. This may be due to the poor weather, but the class aims at keeping the price up by limiting the number of ships on the sea. Malta and Cyprus did not follow the class agreement, causing the efforts of the rest of the class to be less significant.
New Strategy	I plan to continue with the strategy presented in class, regardless of the free riders that exist within the simulation.
Class Application	Free-riding: While the majority of the class dry docked 80% of their ships, those who did not benefited greatly from the increase in tuna prices, and were able to take a free ride on the decrease in the number of ships sent out to sea. Identity: Identity will remain constant throughout the simulation. If the fish population drops below 500, everybody in the class fails. As a unit, we are trying to prevent this outcome. We also demonstrate identity by allowing states that are not doing well, or are close to having a nega-

tive cash on hand, to send all of their ships out so that they do not drop out of the simulation.

Anarchy: Since every state in the simulation exists in the anarchical system, it means that we must rely on self-help. Thus far, the class is beginning to form alliances that will ultimately contribute to success. While most of the class is open to new ways to help everybody do well, some states (Malta) have plans and intentions of their own. When states begin to lose money and resources, unable to keep up with the requirements of the majority of the class, new alliances will be formed.

Sovereignty: Although treaties and alliances are starting to take shape, each state is still sovereign as has the right to do whatever it wants. This also contributes to self-help. Even though I am looking out for the rest of the class by dry docking my ships to prevent the depletion of the amount of tuna in the sea, I am ultimately looking out for myself. If everybody fails, I fail, too.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2015

Current Ranking	11th		Fish Price	4.49	US$
Annual Profit	-1485	€	Price per ton	65.00	US$
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Fish Caught	2,507	
Ships Owned/Sent out	10/2		Total Ships Fishing	105	
Current Cash on Hand	1,803	€	1.00 € =	1.4799	US$
Current Net Worth	5,199	€	Change	+0.0078	US$

Current Strategy	I am applying the same strategy as last year.
How it is working	Because the price of fish increased, I did not lose as much money as last year. This seems to be a promising development; the weather was better this year than last, and the price increased, meaning that our efforts may be contributing to this increase. However, this may also indicate that the population of fish continues to decrease.
New Strategy	According to the Selliasrev treaty, those who have signed the treaty are going to try either knock off Malta, or get her to agree to join the treaty.
Class Application	Balance of Power: Since the group I am following (members of the Selliasrev treaty) intends to gain the top five spots of the simulation, we are attempting to balance power among these states to create a balance within the rest of the states. These five states serve as the "great powers" while states like me are "middle powers." Alliances: The states participating in the Selliasrev treaty are forming a coalition that will attempt to gain all of the power in the simulation (extra credit distribution). Alliances usually come from the formation of treaties, and with

	the Selliasrev treaty, the participating states have formed an alliance.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2016

Current Ranking	11th		Fish Price	1.29	US$
Annual Profit	-2027	€	Price per ton	55.00	US$
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Fish Caught	4,011	
Ships Owned/Sent out	10/0		Total Ships Fishing	122	
Current Cash on Hand	-225	€	1.00 € =	1.4824	US$
Current Net Worth	3,154	€	Change	+0.0025	US$

Current Strategy	I forgot to send in an annual report, causing me to lose a substantial amount of money and my cash on hand to become negative.
New Strategy	According to the instructions from the Selliasrev treaty, I am sending six of my ships to Palestine. This helps me because I no longer have to dry dock my ships and lose profit, and it helps decrease the amount of total ships within the simulation. The alliance continues to keep the tuna alive.
Class Application	Game Theory (Prisoner's dilemma): We are trusting Palestine to accept all of the ships we are sending them and bow out of the competition. The alliance is taking the risk that Palestine accepts all ships and turns around to send all of them out in an attempt to save the state from elimination. This relates to prisoner's dilemma because we do not know if Palestine will do what he says and drop out. Palestine has little incentive to follow the agreement. In all of the transfers made within the simulation, I have to trust that the person on the opposite end of these agreements will keep their promises.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2017

Current Ranking	13th		Fish Price	0.64	US$
Annual Profit	63	€	Price per ton	65.00	US$
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Fish Caught	6,032	
Ships Owned/Sent out	4/4		Total Ships Fishing	167	
Current Cash on Hand	-162	€	1.00 € =	1.4826	US$
Current Net Worth	1,187	€	Change	+0.0002	US$

Current Strategy	I sent four of my ships to Palestine, who then bowed out of the simulation and eliminated a large number of ships from multiple states. This allowed me to avoid dry-docking any of my ships. I finally made a profit.
How it is working	With four ships, I can continue to make a small profit and stay alive in the simulation without the burden of dry-docking or having a large fleet.
New Strategy	Since the price of tuna dropped so low, the treaty members must create a new strategy to be successful.
Class Application	States that are losing money are looking to join Malta in her pursuit for the top spot. However, Morocco has a strong lead, and is not a member of the treaty. This definitely hurts the alliance, as the whole idea behind winning was to distribute the extra credit points among participating states. Nevertheless, if Morocco keeps the lead and ends up winning the simulation, all of our efforts would be for nothing, as none of the treaty members would be rewarded for these now desperate efforts.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2018

Current Ranking	12th		Fish Price	0.41	US$
Annual Profit	33	€	Price per ton	55.00	US$
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Fish Caught	5,535	
Ships Owned/Sent out	4/4		Total Ships Fishing	185	
Current Cash on Hand	-129	€	1.00 € =	1.5002	US$
Current Net Worth	1,220	€	Change	+0.0286	US$

Current Strategy	I sent my entire fleet out with hopes of making enough profit to keep me in the simulation and get myself out of debt.
How it is working	With four ships, I can continue to make a small profit and stay alive in the simulation without the burden of dry-docking or a large fleet.
New Strategy	Because I have been in debt for three years, I must auction off my ships to raise enough money to save me from dropping out of the simulation. I will sell two of my ships to Turkey for $100. This will keep me in the simulation. At this point, I am glad I am a member of this treaty-alliance. They are helping me out now that I am in trouble.
Class Application	The alliance is trying to take over the top spots. The shifts of ships and money have put Cyprus, Turkey, Iceland, Russia, and Portugal in good position to do so. However, with Morocco continuing to dominate, it looks like this task will become more difficult as the years go on.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2019

Current Ranking	14th		Fish Price	0.73	US$
Annual Profit	-267	€	Price per ton	45.00	US$
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Fish Caught	2,322	
Ships Owned/Sent out	2/0		Total Ships Fishing	121	
Current Cash on Hand	-395	€	1.00 € =	1.5106	US$
Current Net Worth	271	€	Change	+0.0104	US$

Current Strategy	I did not submit an annual report this year.
How it is working	After selling two of my ships to Turkey, I had the chance to take myself out of the simulation with a positive net worth and cash on hand, allowing me to pass the simulation and hope that the top powers pulled through for the extra credit in the end. However, because I did not send the rest of my ships to France, and forgot to submit an additional annual report that would allow me to finish the simulation in good position, I am now in trouble.
New Strategy	Now I am in even more trouble than last year, and have little hope to continue in the simulation.
Class Application	Cyprus gained second place ahead of Malta, but Morocco continues to increase his lead.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2020

Current Ranking	7th		Fish Price	1.60	US$
Annual Profit	-3,409	€	Price per ton	55.00	US$
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Fish Caught	3,537	
Ships Owned/Sent out	18/0		Total Ships Fishing	105	
Current Cash on Hand	-3,805	€	1.00 € =	1.5175	US$
Current Net Worth	2,153	€	Change	+0.0104	US$

Current Strategy	With the idea that I was taking myself out of the simulation, I accepted 16 ships from various states to reduce the number of ships in the simulation.
New Strategy	Despite being in a poor position to stay afloat, I proposed to the group to send me enough ships and money to keep me in the competition, agreeing that in four years I will take myself out with as many ships as they need. Unfortunately, I did not submit an updated annual report after they agreed to this proposal, and since I was sent 16 additional ships, I lost a substantial amount of money and am now officially out of the simulation.
Class Application	Malta and Morocco may have formed an alliance, and are now a huge threat to the members of the Selliasrev treaty. This surprises me; Morocco has been cooperating with the Selliasrev alliance and sent me money in my attempt to stay in the simulation. Cyprus remains in second place, but may have trouble in the years to come keeping that position. Turkey, Russia, and Algeria follow the top three leaders.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2021

Current Ranking	18		Fish Price	0.92	US$
Annual Profit	-2768	€	Fish Caught	3,837	
Starting Funds	3,447	€	Total Ships Fishing	124	
Ships Owned	14		1.00 € =	1.5170	US$
Ships to Send Out	0		Change	+0.0064	US$

Current Strategy	I have taken myself out of the simulation due to the number of days I did not send enough ships, if at all, out to fish.
How it is working	I have lost sovereignty due to my mismanagement throughout the simulation.
Class Application	Many states banded together to bail out Turkey, a member of the alliance. This is part of identity, those states are looking out for the welfare of another state because they see similarities between themselves and Turkey. We sent our ships to the top five countries in the hopes of not depleting the fish population. Yet, each of these countries continue to send out all of their ships, now reaching over 20 ships each, in most cases. This is not contributing to keeping the tuna population alive and above 500, as there is the same number of ships in the simulation today. With this in mind, I might have been better off just keeping my ten-ship fleet and acting on my own. However, because of my irresponsibility in sending in annual reports, which is what ultimately led to my failure, it may have been better that I was part of a team, because they bailed me out more often.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2022

Price of Fish	$2.56
Price per ton	$65.00
Fish caught	1,197
Ships sent out	86
Years to go	11
Top 5 Standings:	Morocco, Cyprus, Malta, Algeria, Russia

Two big states did not send in their annual reports, thus increasing the group's chances of increasing their positions. This can shake things up in the positions. However, it appears that Morocco has the lead for the long run.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2023

Price of fish	$4.55
Price per ton	$75.00
Fish caught	2,860
Ships sent out	112
Years to go	10
Top 5 Standings:	Morocco, Cyprus, Malta, Russia, Turkey

The class sent out more ships this year than last, but the price for fish increased. This is a strong indication that the fish population may be depleting faster than we think.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2024

Price of fish	$2.22
Price per ton	$90.00
Fish caught	3,505
Ships sent out	124
Years to go	9
Top 5 Standings:	Morocco, Cyprus, Malta, Russia, Spain

Is there an alliance between Malta and Morocco?

If yes, the chances of my group achieving their goal of extra credit point distribution is hopeless. In addition, the price of fish increased dramatically. This increases fears that the population is running low.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2025

Price of fish	$4.79
Price per ton	$100.00
Fish caught	1,063
Ships sent out	124
Years to go	8
Top 5 Standings:	Morocco, Cyprus, Malta, Russia, Spain

Algeria is close to being out, and pointed out that two of the top three states are not part of any treaty, and indicated that they may have their own alliances. Morocco denied this. Cyprus is catching up to the leader. In addition, Algeria threatened that Malta may save him and ultimately take the lead again herself. By giving her his ships, she will have the largest fleet and may end up winning. Will he sell them to Malta? On the other hand, should Spain buy the ships from him, thus saving Algeria? Algeria threatened, “If you do not save me tonight, my ships will not disappear.”

Therefore, Spain and Russia agreed to purchase Algeria’s ships, if only to prevent Malta from increasing her power and taking the lead. A lingering question remains; Does Malta even want the ships? Does having a large fleet lead to defeat? How many ships would Malta buy? Finally, will Algeria end up failing anyways?

The next issue presented concerned the tuna population. Now, the class fears that the tuna population is getting close to depletion. The remaining states agreed to purchase a fish survey.

So, the final question is, where will the extra credit go? My hopes are dashed, I am now convinced, and I have had a feeling for some time now, the simulation is almost over. I wish that I could still be in the simulation, after my horrific annual report blunder, so I could take more ships out of the simulation for everybody and keep the fish population up. Now I feel as guilty as ever for being so irresponsible throughout this simulation.

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2026

Price of fish	$12.54
Price per ton	$110.00
Fish caught	1,899
Ships sent out	122
Years to go	7
Top 5 Standings:	Morocco, Cyprus, Malta, Russia, Libya

The price of fish and price per ton continues to increase substantially. Yet, everybody continues to send out the same amount of ships. Are they even concerned with the fish population?

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2027

Price of fish	$14.10
Price per ton	$90.00
Fish caught	628
Ships sent out	124
Years to go	6
Top 5 Standings:	Morocco, Cyprus, Malta, Russia, Libya

The Hellenic Republic

Elliniki Dhimokratia

Current Year: 2028

Price of fish	$118.04
Price per ton	$70.00
Fish caught	142
Ships sent out	86
Years to go	5
Top 5 Standings:	Morocco, Cyprus, Malta, Libya, Russia

The simulation ended, as the fish population reached below 500. According the population graph, the point of no return occurred after 2025, when the fish population dropped below 4,000.

What is the reality of this simulation? This is how international relations work. If there is not global cooperation, bad things happen. Why does the United States not follow the Kyoto Protocol? Why did Malta not join the treaty? She was better off by herself than in the treaty. Does that mean that the United States is better off on their own than abiding by the Kyoto Protocol?

On the concept of treaties being broken: In previous classes, there have been treaty violations six times. However, if we did not do the treaty, we would have lost around Day 14. So the big question is did the treaty save us? Or, did it ultimately lead us to fail anyways? I joined the treaty because I was unsure as to how to go about this simulation. Not only did I like the prospect of coming together and acting accordingly in a group with similar goals, I was not concerned with the extra credit at the end. My main concern was the tuna population. In my eyes, joining with the treaty would be the best solution to keeping the tuna population up, and therefore letting everybody succeed. However, the longer I was in the treaty, the more I realized this was not the ultimate goal (as I believed) that the group was trying to attain. Their goal was securing the top five, and later just the top spot, so that some type of “extra credit distribution” could take place. During this pursuit, however, fleets grew larger and larger, and a dangerous greed overtook many of

the leaders of this group. This upset me the more it continued. Therefore, after mismanagement and a stressful departure from the simulation, I obliged to take some of the ships out of the simulation, just as France and Turkey had earlier in their own defeats. Yet, this did little to help the tuna survive, and the simulation has prematurely ended in the remaining states' chase for number one.

So when the treaty became something I no longer felt like abiding by, since the reason for formation was slowly becoming more and more neglected, as a new objective emerged, did I still have to follow it? What actually bound me? Since the treaty-alliance group gave me a good foundation for how to execute plans and ships during the simulation, was I really better off on my own, as Malta and Morocco assumingly were? What bound anyone?

In essence, they were bound by nothing. The only thing that kept the alliance together was the hope that the extra credit would be evenly distributed at the end. But, as more and more people were pulled out of the simulation, whether by getting rid of all of their ships with a positive net worth, or foolishly failing themselves, this hope weakened. The remaining states, in a desperate attempt to catch up to and surpass Morocco, began to attack the tuna fish population. Everybody wanted to win. Nobody wanted to pull back his or her fleets. Consequently, the tuna population depleted. So no one receives extra credit, leader or not. In order for the treaty to have worked, then, there needed to be an attainable goal: reach First Place. However, even at the formation of this treaty, that seemed lost. So, the primary concern of keeping the tuna population from depleting was lost even from the start. Thus, the treaty was a failure at the start.

Why did so many people join it? The hope that the entire class would bond together to keep us all from failing? Perhaps, had we put the extra credit aside and invested our main concern on receiving all participation points, the simulation would have coasted to completion.

This is impractical. Just like the hope of world peace and a common agreement on all earthly things is unpromising. International relations do not work this way. Greed, power, and manipulation drive the system. So, in fifty years, when climate change has consumed the planet, ravaging the earth with devastating consequences, we will all look back and wished we had bonded together to combat it. Had the class known that our actions would have led to an early end to the simulation, I imagine we would have cooperated better.

The next question to address is Would a strongman have helped? Somebody, as soon as gaining the top spot and keeping it for more than one year, who would recruit people and keep them in the top five. This is also impractical, because foreign policy would have been unilateral. It is too difficult for a leader to have a large number of ships—having a

large amount of power would be unrealistic and hard to deal with. Although the world finds a leading power in the United States, the United Nations gives no number one spot. Power is broken up.

A similar thing happened within our class: instead of just one leader, there were five or six. The rest just sat back and watched, hoping they pulled it out in the end and lived up to their extra credit bargain.

So, does this mean that as long as you are a part of the team, you are safe? I would argue that although it can help, it does not ensure safety. I was part of a team, and even if I had not withdrawn, I would still have failed along with the rest of the class. Nobody was safe.

Therefore, it is not the free riders, the people who were not a part of any team, that are the problem. It was the reaction to them. The problem came from the alliance members focusing too much of their concern on what the non-members (Malta and Morocco) were doing. In doing so, the tuna population continued to decline, eventually depleting and ending the simulation.